

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 241356

10
ORIGIN EUR-03

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /004 R

66620
DRAFTED BY:EUR/NE:SPDAWKINS:BAS
APPROVED BY:EUR/NE:WILLIAM BUELL
EUR:MR HUGHES

----- 083719

O 020141Z NOV 74
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 241356

FOR HARTMAN

FOL REPEAT COPENHAGEN 3074 SENT ACTION SECSTATE INFO BONN
EC BRUSSELS NATO HELSINKI HONG KONG LONDON MOSCOW OSLO PARIS
RUEYKJAVIK PEKING STOCOKHOLM TAIPEI TOKYO OCT 31, 1974

QUOTE

C O N F I D E N T I A L COPENHAGEN 3074

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, DA CH
SUBJ: PRIME MINISTER HARTLING'S VISIT TO CHINA

REF: COPENHAGEN 2950 (NOTAL) USNATO 6053

SUMMARY: PRIME MINISTER HARTLING'S VISIT TO CHINA LAST
WEEK INVOLVED TWO LENGTHY NEGOTIATING SESSIONS WITH VICE
PREMIER TENG HSIAO-P'ING, A HALF HOUR HOSPITAL DISCUSSION
WITH CHOU EN-LAI, AND A SURPRISE ONE HOUR MEETING WITH
CHAIRMAN MAO AT A UNDISCLOSED RENDEZVOUS OUTSIDE PEKING.
DURING THE TALKS THE DANES URGED THE CHINESE TO USE THEIR
INFLUENCE IN THE THRD WORLD TO HELP MODERATE OIL PRICES
BEFORE WESTERN EUROPE FACED AN ECONOMIC CALAMITY. FOR
THEIR PART THE CHINESE ADOPTED THEIR STANDARD LINE THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 STATE 241356

THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN THE WORLD, INCLUDING THE MIDDLE
EAST CRISIS, WERE CAUSED BY THE SUPERPOWERS, WITH THE
SOVIET UNION THE CHIEF CULPRIT. BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS
WERE GENERALLY LIMITED TO TRADE MATTERS AND AGREEMENT

WAS REACHED ON A MIXED COMMISSION WHICH WILL MEET PERIODICALLY. AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED TO EXEMPT DANISH SHIPS FROM THE HARBOR TAX IN CHINESE PORTS. IN GENERAL, DANES FOUND IT ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE TO ANALYZE WHAT WAS GOING ON INSIDE CHINA ALTHOUGH THE DELEGATION CAME AWAY WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT CHINA WAS BEGINNING TO OPEN UP A LITTLE MORE TOWARD THE OUTSIDE WORLD. END SUMMARY.

1. TALKS WITH TENG. MFA PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY EIGIL JORGENSEN GAVE CHARGE' RUNDOWN ON PRIME MINISTER HARTLING'S VISIT TO CHINA OCTOBER 18-27 ON WHICH HE HAD BEEN PRINCIPAL MFA ADVISER. (THIS ACCOUNT WAS SUPPLEMENTED BY SUBSEQUENT TALK WITH AGERUP, DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR ECONOMIC POLICY WHO WAS ALSO ALONG.)

2. TWO DAYS HAD BEEN DEVOTED TO NEGOTIATIONS, WITH SESSIONS OF ABOUT 2 1/2 HOURS EACH DAY. THE CHINESE SIDE HAD BEEN LED BY VICE PREMIER TENG HSIAO-P'ING, ABLY SUPPORTED BY DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER CHIAO KUAN HUA. JORGENSEN COMMENTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT TO TELL WHETHER TENG WAS THE "COMING" MAN BUT HE HAD HEADED THE CHINESE DELEGATION WITH AUTHORITY AND HAD BEEN THE ONLY SENIOR OFFICIAL WHO ACCOMPANIED THE DANES ON THEIR VISIT TO MAO. TENG HAD SPOKEN WITHOUT NOTES, AND HAD ONLY OCCASIONALLY GLANCED AT CHIAO, AS IF FOR REASSURANCE. HARTLING HAD STARTED BY POINTING OUT THAT THE DANES HAD RECOGNIZED THE PEOPLES REPUBLIC IN JANUARY 1950, ONE OF THE FIRST WESTERN COUNTRIES TO DO SO. TENG MENTIONED THIS POINT FAVORABLY SEVERAL TIMES IN THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSIONS. TENG SAID THAT THE CHINESE HAD WELCOMED THE CONTINUING DANISH SUPPORT FOR THEIR SEATING IN THE UN. ON THIS POINT HARTLING SAID THAT DENMARK DID INDEED WELCOME CHINA AS A MEMBER OF THE UN BUT HAD EXPECTED THAT THE CHINESE WOULD PLAY A MORE PROMINENT ROLE. HE MADE AN APPEAL TO THEM TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 STATE 241356

EXERCISE THEIR INFLUENCE IN THE UN IN A "RESPONSIBLE" MANNER.

3. HARTLING SAID THAT DENMARK AS A MEMBER OF NATO AND THE EC, TO BOTH OF WHICH IT ATTACHES GREAT IMPORTANCE, HAD ALWAYS ADVOCATED DETENTE AND DISARMAMENT AND WAS, CONSEQUENTLY, A STRONG PROPONENT OF THE CSCE. NEVERTHELESS, FROM THE DANISH POINT OF VIEW THE MOST IMPORTANT PROBLEM FACING EUROPE TODAY WAS THAT CAUSED BY THE ENERGY CRISIS. THE SUDDEN AND UNEXPECTED INCREASE IN ENERGY PRICES BROUGHT THE DANGER THAT THE ENTIRE WESTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMY WOULD BE UNDERMINED. ANY COLLAPSE WOULD, OF COURSE, HAVE SEVERE REPERCUSSIONS, NOT LIMITED TO THE ECONOMIC FIELD. THESE REPERCUSSIONS MIGHT WELL HAVE THEIR EFFECT IN THE DEFENSE FIELD AND THUS AFFECT THE BALANCE

OF POWER IN EUROPE. HARTLING THEN ASKED THE CHINESE LEADERS TO EXAMINE HOW THEY COULD INFLUENCE THE ARAB OIL PRODUCERS TO FOLLOW A MORE MODERATE LINE TOWARD THE CONSUMING COUNTRIES, IN PARTICULAR THOSE IN WESTERN EUROPE WHICH HE CONSIDERED THE MOST VULNERABLE.

4. TENG BEGAN HIS PRESENTATIONS BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS CHINA'S MAIN OPPONENT. THE CHINESE APPRECIATED THE FACT THAT DENMARK WAS A MEMBER OF NATO AND RECOMMENDED THE DANES DO AS MUCH AS THEY COULD TO RE-ARM THEMSELVES AND TO STRENGTHEN NATO. TENG SAID THE CHINESE ALSO ADVOCATED AN ECONOMICALLY STRONGER EUROPE (I.E., THE EC) FOR THE SAME REASONS. HE SAID BLUNTLY THAT THE STRONGER NATO WAS, THE MORE TROOPS THE SOVIETS HAD TO PLACE IN THE WEST AND THE FEWER THEY HAD TO USE AGAINST THE CHINESE. HE SAID THE CHINESE DID NOT TRUST THE SOVIET UNION AT ALL, BUT HE CONCEDED THAT THEY WERE NOW "MORE AT EASE" WITH OTHER BIG POWERS -- HE DID NOT SPECIFICALLY MENTION THE US BY NAME. HE MADE PRACTICALLY NO REFERENCE TO OIL OR ENERGY PROBLEMS DURING THIS FIRST SESSION.

5. THE TALKS ON THE SECOND DAY COMMENCED WITH A DISCUSSION OF BILATERAL PROBLEMS. AN AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED WHICH WILL EXEMPT DANISH SHIPS FROM 3 PERCENT HARBOR TAX IN CHINESE PORTS. JORGENSEN SAID THE DANES REGARD THIS AGREEMENT AS OF SOME IMPORTANCE TO THEM, AND POINTED CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 STATE 241356

OUT THAT NORWAY HAS A SIMILAR AGREEMENT. NEGOTIATIONS WERE ALSO CONCLUDED ON ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT COMMITTEE FOR ANNUAL DISCUSSIONS ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC MATTERS. (SEE SEPTTEL.) THE DANES HAD COMPLAINED POLITELY THAT THE BALANCE OF TRADE HAD BEEN IN CHINA'S FAVOR FOR SOME TIME, ALTHOUGH THE SITUATION HAD LATELY BEEN IMPROVING. THE CHINESE REJOINED THAT DANISH PRICES WERE QUITE HIGH, WITH TENG ASKING HARTLING WHY HE COULD NOT INSTRUCT DANISH FIRMS TO LOWER THEIR PRICES. CULTURAL ACTIVITIES WERE ALSO DISCUSSED. EACH COUNTRY NOW PAYS FOR A HANDFUL OF STUDENTS TO STUDY IN THE OTHER FOR ONE YEAR; THIS MAY BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE POST-GRADUATE STUDENTS AND PROFESSORS, AND THE TIME MAY BE EXTENDED TO TWO YEARS SINCE DANISH SINOLOGISTS FIND ONE YEAR INSUFFICIENT. THIS EXCHANGE WILL NECESSARILY BE LIMITED, HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE LACK OF FUNDS ON THE DANISH SIDE.

6. WHEN THE BILATERAL ASUBJECTS HAD BEEN EXHAUSTED, THE CHINESE GAVE THEIR ANALYSIS OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST. THEY SAW THE CRISIS THERE AS BASICALLY A CONTEST BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIT UNION, AND SAID THE CHINESE DO NOT LIKE THIS INTERFERENCE BY THE TWO SUPERPOWERS. (JORGENSEN COMMENTED DRYLY THAT THERE WERE "NOT MANY

NUANCES" IN THE CHINESE ANALYSIS.) TENG SAID THAT THE CHINESE COULD SEE THE DANISH POINT THAT THE SUDDEN INCREASE IN OIL PRICES HAD GIVEN WESTERN EUROPE SERVE PROBLEMS. HE ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT GET SOME BENEFIT FROM THIS SITUATION, AS MIGHT THE U.S. WHICH WAS ITSELF A PRODUCING COUNTRY. CERTAINLY IT WAS NOT THE INTENTION OF THE ARABS TO STRENGTHEN THE SUPERPOWERS. THE CHINESE SAID THEY WERE VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF USING OIL AS A POLITICAL WEAPON. THE FACT THAT WESTERN EUROPE'S ECONOMY WAS IN BAD SHAPE WAS NOT ONLY DUE TO THE INCREASE IN OIL PRICES. THE CHINESE FEEL THAT THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES SHOULD HAVE HIGHER PRICES FOR THEIR RAW MATERIALS, ALTHOUGH THEY ADMITTED THAT THIS COULD LEAD TO UNINTENDED DIFFICULTIES FOR WESTERN EUROPE. TENG SAID THAT THE CHINESE DID NOT HAVE MUCH INFLUENCE IN THE ARAB WORLD AND WERE NOT EVEN REPRESENTED IN SAUDI ARABIA, THE MOST IMPORTANT OIL PRODUCER. HARTLING INTERJECTED TO SAY THAT IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT CHINA MAY

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 05 STATE 241356

NOT HAVE NORMAL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN CERTAIN AREAS, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT THE CHINESE EXERCISED CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND HE AGAIN APPEALED TO THEM TO EXERCISE THIS INFLUENCE. (JORGENSEN COMMENTED THAT THE DANES COULD NOT BE CERTAIN WHETHER THEIR MESSAGE HAD ANY EFFECT ON THE CHINESE.) TENG THEN CHANGED THE SUBJECT TO EMPHASIZE THAT THE CHINESE DO NOT LIKE THE CONCEPT OF DETENTE. THEY SAW IT ONLY AS A MEANS FOR THE SUPERPOWERS TO GET A LITTLE MORE TIME TO RE-ARM. HE REFERRED TO REPORTS FROM WHAT HE CALLED "RELIABLE AMERICAN SOURCES" THAT THERE WOULD BE A WAR BETWEEN CHINA AND THE SOVIET UNION. (THIS PUZZLED THE DANES, BUT THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO GET ANY CLARIFICATION AS TO THESE "SOURCES"). THE WEST SHOULD NOT BE TOO NICE TO THE SOVIET UNION. HARTLING RESPONDED THAT FOR OBVIOUS REASONS THE DANES FOUND DETENTE NECESSARY. JORGENSEN OBSERVED THAT BOTH SIDES GAVE THEIR TRADITIONAL VIEWS ON THIS SUBJECT.

7. TALK WITH CHOU EN-LAI. THE DANES WERE TAKEN TO A PEKING HOSPITAL FOR A HALF-HOUR DISCUSSION WITH CHOU EN-LAI. TENG AND WANG WERE ALSO PRESENT. THEIR ARRIVAL AT THE HOSPITAL AND GREETING BY CHOU WAS COVERED BY TV, PERHAPS, THE DANES THOUGHT, TO INDICATE TO THE CHINESE THAT CHOU WAS STILL ACTIVE. JORGENSEN SAID THAT HE WAS UNABLE TO GAUGE THE STATE OF CHOU'S HEALTH BUT HE CERTAINLY HAD A VERY CLEAR MIND AND SEEMED WELL INFORMED. NOR WAS IT POSSIBLE FOR THE DANES TO JUDGE HOW MUCH HE IS CONTROLLING DAY TO DAY EVENTS. HIS QUESTIONS WERE CLEAR AND HE SEEMED TO BE FOLLOWING DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING HARTLING'S PREVIOUS TALKS WITH TENG. THE VIEWPOINTS HE PUT FORTH ON THE GENERAL SITUATION WERE BASICALLY THOSE THE DANES HAD ALREADY HEARD FROM TENG. CHOU DID ASK ABOUT DANISH AGRICULTURE,

APPARENTLY TO FIND OUT WHAT DANISH TECHNIQUES MIGHT BE USEFUL IN CHINA. HE ALSO INQUIRED ABOUT OIL. HE THOUGHT THE NORTH SEA OIL DISCOVERIES WOULD HELP ALLEVIATE THE EUROPEAN SITUATION AND WANTED TO KNOW IF THE DANES HAD DISCOVERED OIL IN GREENLAND. HARTLING COUNTERED BY ASKING ABOUT THE OIL SITUATION IN CHINA. CHOU SAID THAT JAPANESE AND SOVIET EXPERTS HAD BEEN UNABLE TO FIND ANY OIL IN CHINA BUT CHINESE EXPERTS HAD FOUND A GOOD DEAL. THUS FAR THE CHINESE HAD ONLY A SMALL SURPLUS FOR
CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 06 STATE 241356

EXPORT BUT THEY MIGHT PROVE TO HAVE VAST OIL RESERVES. OF COURSE THEIR DOMESTIC NEEDS WERE INCREASING, HE SAID, LEAVING THE DANES WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE CHINESE WERE NOT PLANNING TO BECOME MAJOR EXPORTERS IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE. HARTLING INVITED CHOU TO VISIT DENMARK. CHOU SAID THAT HE PERSONALLY WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO COME, WHEREUPON THE DANES GOT THE MESSAGE AND INDICATED THAT ANOTHER SENIOR OFFICIAL WOULD BE WELCOME.

8. MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO. THE MOST SURPRISING PART OF THE TRIP, ACCORDING TO JORGENSEN WAS THE UNEXPECTED DANISH MEETING WITH CHAIRMAN MAO WHICH HAD BEEN HELD OUTSIDE OF PEKING. ONLY PRIME MINISTER AND MRS. HARTLING, JORGENSEN, AMBASSADOR PALUDAN AND DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY IN THE PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, GERSING, MADE THIS TRIP. THE CHINESE HAD TAKEN A NUMBER OF STEPS TO INSURE THAT MAO'S WHEREABOUTS WOULD NOT BE REVEALED. THE DANES HAD PLEDGED NOT TO DISCLOSE WHERE THEY SAW HIM EXCEPT, JORGENSEN SAID, IT WAS "SOMEWHERE TO THE SOUTH". THE TALK HAD LASTED ONE HOUR, BUT AGAIN THE DANES HAD PROMISED NOT TO REVEAL WHAT MAO HAD SAID TO THEM. THEY COULD, HOWEVER, MENTION THE TOPICS DISCUSSED. THESE INCLUDED THE WORLD SITUATION, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE SUPERPOWERS, CHINESE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, AND THE SITUATION IN CHINA. JORGENSEN SAID THAT THE DANES ARE STILL WONDERING WHY MAO CHOSE TO MEET WITH THEM. THEY CAN ONLY CONCLUDE THAT TO SPIKE RUMORS THAT HE WAS DYING THE CHINESE WANTED TO SHOW THEIR OWN PEOPLE (AND THE WORLD) THAT HE WAS STILL ALIVE. THIS WOULD ACCOUNT FOR THE PROMINENT TV AND STILL PHOTO COVERAGE GIVEN TO THE MEETING. JORGENSEN SAID THAT MAO'S PHYSICAL CONDITION WAS OBVIOUSLY NOT GOOD BUT HIS MENTAL FACULTIES SEEMED ALL RIGHT. HE WAS A DIFFERENT PERSONALITY FROM CHOU, MUCH MORE A PHILOSOPHER THAN CHOU WHO HAD IMPRESSED THE DANES AS AN ASTUTE POLITICIAN.

9. IN SUMMING UP, JORGENSEN SAID THAT IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE DANISH VISITORS TO ASSESS WHAT WAS GOING ON IN CHINA OR THE INTERPLAY OF FORCES THERE. TALKING THROUGH INTERPRETERS (THE DANES IN ENGLISH) HAD LIMITED THE AMOUNT OF GIVE AND TAKE AND THERE WAS PRACTICALLY NO CHANCE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 07 STATE 241356

GET ANY "FEEL" AS ONE WOULD IN WESTERN COUNTRIES. NEVER-
THELESS THE DANES HAD LEFT WITH THE IMPRESSION THAT THE
CHINESE WERE SLOWLY OPENING TO THE OUTSIDE WORLD. THE
TALKS HAD BASICALLY BEEN GENERAL IN NATURE SINCE, ASIDE
FROM MINOR TRADE ISSUES, THERE WERE NO BILATERAL
PROBLEMS. UN PROBLEMS AS SUCH HAD NOT BEEN DISCUSSED.
THE FACT THAT THE TALKS WERE OF THIS GENERAL NATURE PROBABLY
HELPED PRODUCE THE GOOD ATMOSPHERE THE DANES HAD NOTED,
JORGENSEN CONCLUDED.

DUNNIGAN

UNQUOTE. INGERSOLL

CONFIDENTIAL

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 27 JUL 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: ITINERARY, PRIME MINISTER, VISITS, MINISTERIAL VISITS, TRAVEL REPORTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 02 NOV 1974
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: golinofr
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1974STATE241356
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter:
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D740314-0011
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1974/newtext/t19741186/abbrzaay.tel
Line Count: 289
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 6
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: COPENHAGEN 2950 (NOTAL) USNATO 6053
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: golinofr
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 03 APR 2002
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <03 APR 2002 by martinml>; APPROVED <07-Aug-2002 by golinofr>
Review Markings:

Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
30 JUN 2005

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PRIME MINISTER HARTLING'S VISIT TO CHINA
TAGS: PFOR, DA, CH, (HARTLING)
To: BRUSSELS
Type: TE
Markings: Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 30 JUN 2005